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Abstract: 
The purpose of this study was to determine the role of corporate governance, dividend policy and capital 
structure on ownership structure toward the firm value. The study was conducted to manufacturing firms listed at 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2008-2011. The results showed that institutional majority ownership 
structure is the cause of agency problems, which can be mitigated by corporate governance mechanism and 
dividend policy, thereby increasing the value of the of the company. Capital structure can be used as a 
mechanism to reduce agency problems but cannot affect the value of the company due to the implementation of 
the company's corporate governance resulting in increasing debt in the capital structure and dividend policy. 
Dividend policy and capital structure is not a substitute nor complementary in reducing agency problems. 
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1. Background and Goals of the Study 
Gigonani et al. (2011) suggest that two types of agency problems; vertical agency problem that exist between 
owners and managers and horizontal agency problems that exist between controlling (majority) shareholders and 
minority owners. Separation of ownership and control functions within the company creates agency problems 
when potential managerial behaviors (agents) are not in accordance with the interests of shareholders (principals) 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and differences in the interests of the majority shareholders to minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny,1996), as found in Indonesia, as a developing country, in which institutional 
shareholders become the majority shareholders and will do expropritaion to minority shareholders (Alwi, 2009).  
The agency problems affect capital structure requirements and dividend policy as a monitoring mechanism on 
managerial behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, the agency problems can be mitigated through 
monitoring done by creditors by means of the company's capital structure, to ensure that the actions done by 
shareholders (majority) are in accordance with the interests of creditors (Alwi, 2009) and the use of dividends as 
the monitoring of capital markets (Easterbrook, 1984). 
Dividend policy is the substitution of capital structure on textile company and a complementary mechanism 
without the ownership structure in reducing the agency problems. The use of dividend policy and capital 
structure will give effect to the agency costs that companies use as a substitute, as reported by Ramachandran 
and Packkirisamy (2010) who did research on a textile company, or as a complementary (Noronha et al.,1996). 
At the time when dividend policy possess higher agency costs compared with the use of debt in the capital 
structure, the company funds its operation from debt; meanwhile, funding for operation will be taken from 
dividend policy when the agency cost is lower than the debt in the capital structure so resulting in ineffective 
monitoring. This implies on the need of alternative monitoring to reduce agency problems (Farinha, 2003) such 
as the implementation of corporate governance (Al-Shabibi and Ramesh, 2011; Dharmastuti and Wahyudi, 
2013). 
Corporate Governance (CG) is an alternative mechanism to reduce the agency problems since it can become a 
controlling tool on the decisions taken by the company—taken based on the interests of managerial behavior and 
by considering protection toward investors and creditors. The implementation of corporate governance is 
mandated in Act Number 40 Year 2007 regarding Limited Company (Ltd) and Number 8 Year 1995 on capital 
markets to protect the interests of investors and creditors. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1996) describe that the implementation of CG in a company will increase the demand made 
by creditors because of the guarantee of better governance (supply-view), such as the research by Mousavi et al. 
(2012); but the increase in debt in the capital structure will increase the risk of bankruptcy. Thus, companies with 
good governance will reduce the possibility of debt in the capital structure (demand-view), such as research by 
Mai (2010) and Hasan and Butt (2009). 
Dividends distributed to shareholders is an indication that the company has good governance or, as La Porta et 
al. (2000) state, an outcome hypothesis, such as research by Jiraporn et al. (2011). On the other hand, dividends 
can be used as a mechanism to build the company's reputation with poor governance (substitution hypothesis), 
such as research by Devi and Subramaniam (2011) which find a negative but insignificant results. 
Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) statistics showed that manufacturing sector has funding needs and dividend 
distribution that are higher than the primary and tertiary sectors, from the data on primary and tertiary sectors 
throughout 2008-2011. This will potentially make agents and shareholders in manufacturing companies to act in 
an opportunistic way in the use of debt in its capital structure and dividend policy. 
Based on the previous description, the ownership structure causing the agency problems in a manufacturing 
company can be reduced through the implementation of corporate governance, dividend policy and capital 
structure, meaning thatr corporate governance will provide protection to creditors in providing credit and to 
investors in dividends divided thus affecting the value of the company. However, previous studies show 
inconsistencies in findings so reassessment on theories is required. The description of variables and indicatos (is 
shown in table 1), as well the conceptual framework of this study is shown in figure 1 
Table 1: Variables and Indicators 
No Research  
Variables (latent) 
Indicators Notation in Model 
1 Ownership 
 Structure (X1) 
1.1.Managerial Ownership % Manajerial 
1.2.Institutional Ownership % Insitusional 
2 Corporate  
Governance (Y1) 
2.1.Number of commissioners Dwn Komisaris 
2.2.Proportions of independent 
 commisioners 
% Kom 
 Independent 
3 Capital  
Structure (Y2) 
3.1.Debt equity ratio DER 
3.1.Debt ratio DR 
4 Dividend 
 Policy (Y3) 
4.1.Dividend yield DY 
4.2.Dividend payout ratio DPR 
4.3.Dividend per share DPS 
5 Firm Value (Z1) 5.1.Stock price Hrg Saham 
5.2.Tobins Q ratio Q 
5.3.Price book value PBV 
Source: previous research 
 
So, in the present study attempt has been made to study the role of corporate governance, dividend policy, and 
capital structure on ownership structure toward the firm value. Further the discussion has been divided into four 
sections. Section 2 explains research methodology used in the study. Section 3 shows results of study. Finally, 
section 4 represents conclusions of the study. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
 
This study is to analyze the roles of the corporate governance, dividend policy, and capital structure on 
ownership structure toward the firm value with explain of research problems in this study are (a) whether 
ownership structure affect corporate governance, (b) whether ownership structure affects capital structure, (c) 
whether ownership structure affects dividend policy, (d) whether corporate governance affects the capital 
structure, (e) whether corporate governance affects dividend policy, (f) whether capital structure affects dividend 
policy, (g) whether corporate governance affects firm value, (i) whether capital structure affects firm value, and 
(j) whether dividend policy affects company value. 
  
2. Research Method 
The quantitative approach to the study under explanatory design aimed to test the hypothesis according to 
research problems. Secondary research data was derived from the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD) 
that comes with the annual report and the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) Statistics 2008-2011 for 
manufacturing companies. Samples were chosen though a purposive sampling technique, for companies that (a) 
pay dividends, (b) have managerial ownership, and (c) have independent commissioners as part of the company 
board of commissioners--10 samples were obtained for each of the four-year period, so there were 40 units of 
observation.  
Measurement of variables consisted of (a) the ownership structure, that is managerial ownership referring to the 
percentage of stock owned by directors and commissioners in comparison to the number of shares outstanding 
(Indahningrum and Handy, 2009) and institutional ownership, that is the percentage of share owned by 
institution compared to the number of shares outstanding (Wen and Jia, 2010); (b) corporate governance, namely 
(ln) the number of board commissioners (Hassan and Butt, 2009) and the percentage of independent 
commissioners in the board of commissioners (Wulandari and Widaryanti, 2008); (c) the capital structure, that is 
debt equity ratio which refers to the percentage of debt compared to equity and debt ratio—debt ratio is the 
percentage of debt compared to total assets (Abu-Rub, 2012); (d) the dividend policy, that refers to dividend 
payout ratio which is the ratio of earnings per share distributed to the shareholders (Hussainey et al., 2011), 
dividend yield is the ratio of stock prices compared to cash dividends (Abdelsalam et al., 2008) and dividend per 
share which is the (ln) of the actual cash dividends (Ullah, 2012); (e) the value of the company, namely Tobins Q 
(the ratio of the market value of shares compared to book value of debt (Abu-Rub, 2012); price-book value is the 
ratio of the market price of the stock compared to its book value (Stella, 2009) and stock price is (ln) year-end 
stock price (Waweru et al., 2012). 
This study used a descriptive and analytical path analysis, that was the partial least square (PLS) due to the tiered 
effect on the variables of the study and the need of comprehensive analysis. Data analysis of PLS was conducted 
using SmartPLS and followed two-stage approach for assesing the outer model and the inner modal respectively. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis is analysis to describe the general condition of the data such as total sample, minimum 
number of the sample, mean, and standard deviation. The outputs for descriptive data of this study are shown  in 
Table 2. The results of the descriptive statistics show that the manufacturing companies had large variations in 
price-book value, while the dividend yield had small variations. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Analysis 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
Institutional Ownership .6322 .19058 
Managerial Ownership .0758 .10676 
Number of Board Commissioners 5.9250 2.91229 
Proportion of Independent 
Commissioners .3984 .13110 
Debt Ratio .3633 .14872 
Debt Equity Ratio .7667 .63374 
Dividend Payout Ratio .4297 .72697 
Dividend per Share 221.9250 272.91479 
Dividend Yield .0521 .04754 
Tobins-Q .9292 .79479 
Price Book Value 1.9095 1.99766 
Stock Price 9805.5000 17771.39890 
Source: Results of Analysis 
The descriptive statistics show that the manufacturing companies included some sub-sectors. Those sub-sectors 
were automotive and components (4 firms), tobacco manufacturers (1 firm) Miscellaneous Industry (3 firms), 
food and beverages (1 firm), cable (1 firm) 
3.2. Path analysis 
Structural equation models usually involve latent variable with multiple indicator (table 1) and followed two-
stage approach for assesing the outer model and the inner modal respectively 
The measurement model or outer model specifies the relationship between and indicators and latent variabel. 
Testing outer model is a test on indicator of variables, that can be described in a formative model that is in the 
ownership structure, dividend policy, capital structure, and firm value and reflective model on corporate 
governance variables .Using a two-tailed test with a significance level of 10%, the outer model will be 
significant if the t-statistics is larger than 1.684. The results of outer model is as shown in Table 3 
Based on table 3, there were 2 indicators in measuring corporate governance:number of board Commissioners, 
proporton of independent Commissioners. Capital structre while all the loadings were greater than 1.684, hence 
there were 2 indicator to measure. Capital structure: debt equity ratio and debt ratio. There were 2 indicators in 
measuring dividend policy and fimr value. Dividen policy:dividend yield and dividend per share, firm value: 
tobinsQ and sotck price. But in measuring ownership structure:  1 indicator (institutional ownership) 
The results showed that the ownership structure was not the cause of the agency problems because 
manufacturing companies had relatively small proportion of managerial ownership, which was only 7.58%. 
Arifin (2005) mentions the small proportion of managerial ownership does not lead to opportunistic behavior 
who only acts in his/her own interest. This results do not support the “opportunism behavior of agent” but 
support that organizational managers’ main motivations are to serve the organization’s best interest and mission. 
According to it, the manager seeks essentially to do a good job and be a good steward of the firm assets 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The empirical fact (table 2) shows that the average institutional ownership in the 
observation periode was above 50%, ie 63.22% respectively for the years 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. This 
means that institutional ownership have absolute voting power to expropriation minority shareholders.  
Dividend payout ratio is not an indicator of dividend policy because managerial stock ownership is not 
opportunistic in the allocation of retained earnings. PBV is not an indicator of the value of the company as it 
relates to the activities of investment companies, not to the dividend policy and capital structure. Mulyono 
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(2011) proves that PBV can be used in setting investment strategy because by using PBV ratio, investor can 
predict which stocks will be undervalued and overvalued so the can gain significant return. 
Table 3: Outer Model Output 
Indicators Loading factors 
corporate governance -> Number of Board 
Commissioners 3.962 
corporate governance -> Proportion of 
Independent Commissioners  11.345 
Managerial Ownership -> Ownership 
structure 
0.798 
Institusional Ownership -> Ownership 
structure 
4.072 
DPR -> dividend policy 0.116 
DPS -> dividend policy 3.169 
DY -> dividend policy 2.902 
DR -> capital structure 4.798 
DER -> capital structure 1.829 
PBV -> firm value 0.318 
Q -> firm value 1.740 
stock price -> firm value 9.928 
Source: Results of Analysis 
The inner model spesifies the relationships between unobserved or latent variables. Testing of inner models is 
used to test the hypothesis in accordance with the conceptual framework of the research. The results of inner 
model is as shown in Table 4 
Based on the formulation of the problem research that have been built as well as analysis of the research, 
conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
1. Corporate governance and dividend policies is showing a significant role on ownership structure 
toward the firm value. Effect of each independent variable on the corporate governance, dividend 
policy, capital structure and firm value are as follows: 
a. Ownership structure have a significant positive affect on corporate governance 
b. Ownership structure have a significant negative affect on dividend policy 
c. Corporate governance have a significant positive affect on firm value 
d. Dividend policy have a significant positive affect on firm value 
e. Corporate governance have a significant positive affect on dividend policy. 
f. Corporate governance have a significant positive affect on capital structure 
2. Capital structure’s is not showing a signifikan role on ownership structure toward the firm value. 
Effect of each independent variable on the corporate governance, dividend policy, capital 
structure and firm value are as follows: 
a. Effect of ownership structure on capital structure is significantly negative 
b. Capital structure variables do not have significant affect on firm value 
c. Capital structure variables do not have significant affect on dividend policy 
d. does not affect the dividend policy 
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Table 4: Inner Model Output 
Independent Dependent Orignal Sample t-test Decision 
Corporate Governance Dividend policy 0.7569 13.7199 Significant 
Corporate Governance Firm Value 0.1721 2.8845 Significant 
Corporate Governance Capital Structure 0.2934 3.7685 Significant 
Dividend Policy Firm Value 0.8036 14.0548 Significant 
Ownership Structure Corporate Governance 0.3067 4.4010 Significant 
Ownership Structure Dividend Policy -0.2901 2.6528 Significant 
Ownership Structure Capital Structure -0.6421 12.927 Significant 
Capital Structure Dividend Policy -0.1194 1.3098 Insignificant 
Capital Structure Firm Value 0.0676 1.2136 Insignificant 
Source: Results of Analysis 
4. Conclusion 
The results of hypothesis testing showed that the agency problems were caused by institutional shareholders, 
which does not support the statement by Jensen and Meckling (1976) which states that managerial shareholders 
have opportunistic behavior. Increased institutional shareholders who did expropriation to the minority 
shareholders will increase the need for monitoring of capital markets through dividends (Easterbrook, 1984); 
monitoring of creditors (Alwi, 2009) and corporate governance (Dharmastuti and Wahyudi, 2013). However, 
there was not any relationship found between the capital structure and dividend policy, as to give a signal of 
good corporate governance, the company implements dividend payout policy (outcome hypothesis) and 
increases debt as a result of the creditors’ demand (supply-view). This implies that the use of debt resulting in 
reduced cashflow does not affect the company's dividend distribution to shareholders. That implies that an 
increase in debt in the company's capital structure does not increase the risk due to good corporate governance; 
thus, companies with capital structure from debt or non-debt will not experience an effect on their value. 
Dividend policy can reduce agency problems, and investors in Indonesia are characterized by their willingness to 
get dividends than capital gains. Therefoe, dividend policy and governance that provide a guarantee for dividend 
payment to investors can increase the value of the company. 
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